Continuity with change in Sri Lanka’s presidential election

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Sri Lanka’s presidential election is scheduled for 21 September. Ranil Wickremesinghe, whom parliament elected president when Gotabaya Rajapaksa fled in July 2022, would have preferred to postpone the polls. His government’s measures to stabilise the economy in line with International Monetary Fund (IMF) recommendations and his aversion to sidelining the most corrupt members of the Rajapaksa family have made him unpopular.

Wickremesinghe belongs to the United National Party, but holds sway in parliament thanks to the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) party controlled by the Rajapaksas. The president and SLPP leaders postponed the local government elections scheduled for March 2023 when it was clear they would get trounced. Sri Lanka’s Supreme Court ruled this action violated voters’ rights, yet some feared the president would look for ways to also cancel the presidential poll.

This will likely be the first presidential election when no candidate wins a majority, which will make second- and third-preference votes important. Predicting the outcome is difficult. What is clear is that the island’s bankruptcy and the potential threat to old elite hegemony make this among the most important post-independence polls.

The minority vote is divided among the leading candidates. But these Tamil and Muslim votes could play a decisive role, unlike in 2010 and 2019, when Mahinda and Gotabaya Rajapaksa, respectively, won thumping majorities mainly through the majority Sinhalese Buddhist vote.

Besides Wickremesinghe, there are two other main candidates in a field of 39. Sajith Premadasa of the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) is ideologically similar to Wickremesinghe. Anura Kumara Dissanayake of the Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) is contesting as part of the leftist National People’s Power Alliance (NPP) and provides a clear contrast. The NPP is critical of the IMF’s reforms and should Dissanayake win, it will signal a political realignment.

The JVP was responsible for two insurrections that killed thousands in 1971 and during 1987–89. Though now part of the political mainstream, many feel the party has not apologised sufficiently and seeks to minimise its past by contesting through the NPP. Most who lost family due to the JVP’s violence will not vote for Dissanayake. Previously, vocal support for the JVP failed to translate into votes — yet this time may be different given the party and its coalition partners are the least tarnished by corruption.

The SLPP’s Namal Rajapaksa entered the fray late when the party’s candidate dropped out. The Rajapaksas considered backing Wickremesinghe, but could not reach an agreement to their liking. The SLPP knows it will lose, but Namal’s entry helps his family’s quest to ensure a political dynasty. This contest could position him to lead the party in future elections and prevent its disintegration, given prominent SLPP cadres have now switched to the incumbent president’s side.

Regardless of who wins, Sri Lanka will continue to struggle economically. This will be especially so after the government starts repaying loans in 2028. Given the current economic crisis, Sri Lanka will need to keep seeking bilateral and multilateral assistance for the foreseeable future. This is why the SJB and NPP say they will continue working with the IMF, albeit by pursuing different policies. Whatever their plans, the country is now committed to meeting revenue projections. Failing to do so could worsen the economy and unleash protests like those that ousted the Rajapaksas in 2022.

The economic crisis will likely prevent the next president from pursuing drastically different foreign policies. Indeed, the three main candidates indicate they would strive to maintain neutral foreign relations. But many see differences given the relatively pro-Western orientation of Wickremasinghe’s UNP and Premadasa’s SJB, compared to the relatively China-friendly SLPP and NPP. A victory for Dissanayake or Namal Rajapaksa will be considered a victory for China, while a victory for Wickremesinghe or Premadasa would continue the multi-aligned status quo extra-sensitive to Indian, Japanese and Western interests.

In this context, a recent Social Indicator poll conducted through the Center for Policy Alternatives, a Colombo-based think tank, shows that a majority of Sri Lankans see Japan as a more preferable partner for Sri Lanka over the United States, India and China .

Preference for Japan varies depending on ethnicity and support for the main presidential candidates. Most Sinhalese, who constitute around 75 per cent of the population, prefer Japan. Most minorities —mainly Tamils — prefer India.

Despite such stark ethnic divisions, the entire country votes as one constituency when electing the president. The poll results vindicate this integrative effect, because voters’ foreign policy preferences are similar, regardless of the candidate they support. A clear majority supporting Ranil Wickremesinghe , Sajith Premadasa  and Anura Kumara Dissanayake  prefer Japan, consistently followed by the United States, India and China.

This suggests no matter who becomes president, the least controversial choice when seeking loans and investment will be Japan. While various constituencies harbour suspicions — due to historical, ideological and ethnoreligious reasons — of the other three states, Japan is considered a friend to Sri Lankan interests.

India’s ranking over China may be due to the ways it helped the island overcome widespread scarcity for essential items and recent grumbling about China’s being insufficiently helpful when assisting Sri Lanka restructure its loans. Notwithstanding regular criticism, the United States remains influential and stands to pursue its interests in ways aligned with Indian preferences.

One finding of the Centre’s poll is the extent to which those who support Dissanayake also prefer Japan over the other states, with over 65 per cent support. This suggests Dissanayake and the NPP could work through Japan to partner with the other major powers. Dissanayake’s invitation to India in February and his meetings with India’s National Security Advisor and External Affairs Minister also indicate the JVP wants to discard its prior anti-India stance. Such dynamics suggest there is unlikely to be much change to Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, irrespective of who wins the presidential election.

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